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Abstract 
The paper studies the efficiency of Swedish labour market policies for young 
workers. Using age discontinuities which define which policy regime an indi-
vidual is covered by we present quasi-experimental evidence on the relative ef-
ficiency of different policy regimes currently in use. Results suggest that youth 
policies are more effective than the policies covering adult unemployed. The 
effects mainly appear early in the unemployment spell; we find no evidence of 
positive long run effects. To uncover which part of the policies that accounts 
for the positive effect, we use matching techniques to study the relative effi-
ciency of youth programmes and general adult programmes which are available 
also for the young. The results indicate that youth programmes are significantly 
less effective than adult oriented programmes. Overall, the evidence thus sug-
gest that youth policies speed up the transition from unemployment to jobs ei-
ther due to pre-programme deterrence effects or because of more intense job 
search support from the public employment services before the programmes. 
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2 1 Introduction 
Youth unemployment and late labour market entry are of growing concern in 
the Swedish policy discussion. However, the large scale evaluations of Swedish 
youth labour market policies that exist are based on data from the 1990s and 
leave several issues unexplained.
1 This paper presents some additional evi-
dence on the effectiveness of current youth labour market policies in order to 
fill some of this knowledge gap.  
Swedish labour market programmes targeted at youth have a history dating 
back to 1984. Youth programmes were however not used on a larger scale until 
the start of the economic recession in the early 1990s. Currently, young unem-
ployed are treated differently from other unemployed in both “hard” aspects, 
such as in the types of available programmes and the timing of the programmes 
and less easily measured aspects such as the priority that case workers should 
put into job search assistance according to various policy documents. 
Whereas labour market programmes generally are administrated by the Pub-
lic Employment Services (PES), unemployed in the age range 20-24 are some-
times referred to a municipality-provided program (the youth guarantee, YG), 
and other times referred to normal PES-administrated programmes. On aver-
age, programme placements take place earlier for individuals below 25 than for 
older unemployed.  
Previously estimated effects of programmes for young people vary. Several 
earlier studies of the 1980s found positive effects, at least for some pro-
grammes under some circumstances and in the long run. But these results were 
based on small samples and cannot readily be generalised.
2 Larsson (2003) 
found negative employment and income effects of both labour market training 
for youth and youth practice in the early 1990s. In addition, she found that la-
bour market training (but not youth practice) had a negative effect on the tran-
sition rates to regular education. Comparing youth practice and training, the 
former outperformed the latter, at least in the short run.
3  
                                                      
1 The only previous large sample studies are Larsson (2003) and Carling and Larsson (2005). See 
Calmfors et al (2004) for a review of other evaluations of Swedish youth programs and of Swed-
ish labour market policies in general. 
2 The studies are surveyed in Calmfors et al (2004). 
3 This result is in conformity with evaluation results for Swedish  programmes for adults in the 
1990s. 
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3 The only study of the municipality provided youth guarantee (Carling & 
Larsson, 2005) pertains to 1998, the first year of the programme. The evidence 
in that paper indicates that the employment prospects of the participants were 
not significantly affected by the introduction of the youth guarantee. Due to the 
shape of the hazard function the authors interpret their estimated zero net-effect 
as the sum of two opposing forces: a positive pre-programme effect and a nega-
tive effect from the time of program placement. 
The overall aim of this paper is to provide new evidence on the effective-
ness of Swedish youth labour market policies in promoting transitions from un-
employment to work. To this end, we perform three types of analyses. First, we 
study the effects of being covered by each policy package depending on the age 
group (20-24 and 25+). The identifying strategy is to compare individuals who 
are close in age but are covered by different policy regimes. The results from 
this analysis will provide an overall judgement of the effectiveness of youth la-
bour market policies. This analysis basically updates the results in Carling & 
Larsson (2005).  
However, these estimates are very much “reduced form” in character since 
the policy package has many different components. One such component is 
that, as we have already mentioned, some youth programmes are run by the 
municipalities.
4 This represents a more general trend towards more of decen-
tralisation in Swedish labour market policies. Hence, in the second part of the 
analysis we analyse to what extent any effects of the policy regimes for youth 
may be attributed to the programme providers: does decentralisation of labour 
market policies improve the results? This question has not previously been ad-
dressed in connection with Swedish ALMPs.  
Young people between 20 and 24 years old are exposed to different pro-
gramme types. The third part of our analysis deals with the effects of training 
programmes compared to programmes with both training and workplace ex-
perience components (“practice programmes”). This analysis brings the analy-
sis in Larsson (2003) more up to date.
5
In the latter two parts of the analysis we cannot use age discontinuities for 
identification. Instead, we use matching techniques and identify the effects of 
                                                      
4 A complication related to the municipality programmes is that there is a serious lack of infor-
mation about programme content. The scattered available evidence indicates that programme 
content varies quite a lot between municipalities. 
5 Unlike Larsson (2003) we do not, however, compare participation in these programmes to non-
participation. 
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4 the programs under the identifying assumption that participants in different 
forms of programs with the same background characteristics have the same ex-
pected outcomes irrespective of program they actually participate in. To this 
end, we use an unusually rich register data set which makes the causal interpre-
tation more credible. 
Our results, first, show that the policy regime for the 20-24 year olds is ef-
fective in shortening the unemployment spells, even though the effects are 
short-lived, providing a somewhat more positive picture than Carling and Lars-
son (2005). Second, municipality provided youth programmes are outper-
formed by labour market programmes provided by the PES. Finally, pro-
grammes providing practice seem to outperform training programmes for 
young people for some outcomes but not for others. Hence, these results are 
less clear-cut than the results in Larsson (2003).  
Since the positive effects of the youth policies materialize before the pro-
grams are typically set in, a tentative overall conclusion is that the positive ef-
fects from youth policies are driven by higher quality search-assistance and/or 
pre-programme deterrence effects from early expected programme entry rather 
than from positive treatment effects for those actually participating in the pro-
grammes. This is supported by the fact that the youth programs are outper-
formed by the programs available for older unemployed when studying the ef-
fects on participants.  
How do these results for Swedish youth labour market policies square with 
evidence from other countries? White & Knight (2003) surveyed the literature 
on the effects of labour market programmes for young people.
6 Wage subsidy 
programmes generally seemed to increase the job-finding rate, whereas studies 
of job creation programmes in the public sector pointed to negative effects of 
such programmes. The results for vocational training programmes were mixed, 
whereas job search assistance programmes generally produced positive results. 
This pattern of programme effects is consistent with the general pattern of pro-
gramme effects found for adults, both in Sweden and internationally (Calmfors, 
Forslund & Hemström, 2004; Martin & Grubb, 2001). Blundell et al. (2004) 
studied the New Deal for Young People in the UK. This programme has many 
components, two of which are mandatory job search assistance and wage sub-
sidies. The authors found that both job search assistance and wage subsidies 
                                                      
6 See also the review in Heckman, LaLonde & Smith (1999) and the discussion in Heckman & 
Krueger (2003). 
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5 contributed to an increase in the job-finding probability, but that the treatment 
effect was much larger in the short run than in the long run. In applicable parts, 
these findings are in line with our results. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide a 
background by discussing Swedish labour market policies targeted at young 
people. In Section 3 we discuss our identification strategies. Section 4 gives a 
data description. The results are presented in Section 5, dealing with the effects 
of different policy regimes, and Section 6, treating the relative effects of differ-
ent programmes. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2  Swedish ALMPs targeted at youth 
Until the early 1980s there were no programmes targeted at youth – young per-
sons could participate in the same programmes as adults, i.e., training pro-
grammes and relief work (temporary public sector jobs). The first Swedish la-
bour market programme explicitly targeted at youth was youth teams intro-
duced in 1984. In 1987 and 1989 this programme was followed by two differ-
ent versions of a programme called schooling-in slots. During 1992 youth prac-
tice was introduced. This programme, in contrast to its predecessors, rapidly 
reached large volumes. The programme was targeted at youth below the age of 
25. 
In the 1994 electoral campaign, the incumbent minister of labour promised 
that no young person (below age 25) should be left unemployed for more than 
100 days. Instead, all young unemployed should be placed in programmes after 
100 days of unemployment. The general election resulted in a new government, 
but the objective to refer young people to labour market programmes at an 
early stage of the unemployment spell has been present in one way or the other 
since the mid 1990s. 
Since the early 1990s, Swedish municipalities are responsible for offering 
secondary education to all youth below age 20. In addition, the municipalities 
have an obligation to keep themselves informed about the employment status 
of all youth between 16 and 20 years of age. Since October 1995, Swedish mu-
nicipalities have also had the opportunity to assume responsibility for the em-
ployment situation of youth between 18 and 19 years. This municipality pro-
vided program, called municipality youth programme (MYP), provides educa-
tion or practice to facilitate a transition to work or to stimulate participation in 
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6 regular education. Although referral to the MYP is conditional on the signing 
of a contract between the municipalities and the PES almost all unemployed 
teenagers have been covered by such a contract and the MYP “market share” 
among programmes for teenagers has been nearly 100 percent since.
7  
Although on the agenda since 1994, the target that unemployed youths (be-
low 25) should be placed in programmes within 100 days was not met by 1998. 
In 1998 there was a reform opening for the possibility of municipality provided 
youth programmes also for unemployed in the age range 20 to 24. A condition 
was that the municipality and the regional labour market authority signed an 
agreement to this effect – something which happened in some, but not all, of 
the municipalities. The contract meant that the PES could refer unemployed to 
the municipality in a programme called the youth guarantee
8 (YG). The YG 
amounts to an obligation to offer the target group a full-time activity after 100 
days of unemployment.
9 The duration of the programme is capped at 12 
months. In 2004, 205 out of 281 municipalities had signed an agreement with 
the regional labour market authority about the programme. 
In contrast to the MYP for teenagers, the YG does not have a 100 % market 
share of programmes for 20-24 year olds. This happens for two reasons. The 
first is that some municipalities have chosen not to sign the contracts, and the 
second is that the PES may refer 20-24 year olds to programmes not targeted 
explicitly at youths. The two major programmes in this category are labour 
market training and practice programmes.  
From this description it should be clear that Swedish labour market policies 
for relatively young workers have three different “regimes”, one for teenagers 
(18-19 year olds), one for young adults (20-24) and one general regime (25+).  
It is important to note that the presence of the municipality provided youth 
programmes is not the only difference in treatment between the different age 
groups. For instance, even in the municipalities that do not provide the YG-
programme for young adults, we see much earlier programme placements for 
24-year olds than for 25-year olds. We attribute this to a policy target that per-
                                                      
7 According to Sibbmark & Forslund (2005), 265 municipalities (out of 281) had signed an 
agreement with the regional labour market authority in 2004 and the ones that had not signed ap-
pear to have had a very small number of unemployed teenagers. 
8 Previously, the development guarantee. 
9 The unemployment clock starts ticking from the day the unemployed youth registers as a job 
seeker at the public employment service. 
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7 tain to all PES activity, namely that young adults should be placed in pro-
grammes early.  
A second important note is that youth unemployment is measured and tar-
geted separately, suggesting that the PES-offices may put specific effort into 
job broking activities for this group. An indicator that this may be true is that 
some PES-offices have specific case-workers for young unemployed (see e.g. 
Lundin, 2004). 
Thus, in our analysis we will try to first evaluate two of the three available 
policy regimes against each other.
10 The second part of the analysis compares 
actual participants in municipality provided youth programmes to participants 
in general PES-provided labour market programmes. It should be noted that 
treatment by the municipality is somewhat of a black box from an evaluator’s 
point of view, the municipalities are free to define the program as they choose 
and there is no systematic follow up of the actual implementation. Our final 
part of the analysis therefore compares participants in training programmes to 
participants in practice programmes in order to get some insights into which 
form of treatment works better for young unemployed workers.  
 
 
3 Identification  strategies 
The two parts of our analysis use different types of identifying assumptions. In 
the first part we use age discontinuities to identify the effects of being part of 
one policy package relative to another. In the second part, which compares 
programme types and providers, we have to rely on comparisons between ob-
servably equivalent individuals in order to identify the effects. This analysis 
thus rests on stronger identifying assumptions than the previous part. However, 
we believe that by conditioning on participation in some form of programme 
(rather than comparing to further open unemployment) the results are less sus-
ceptible to alternative explanations. 
 
                                                      
10 We do not evaluate the policy regime for the teenagers. The main reason is that the difference 
in labour market performance between persons aged 19 and 20 is likely to be much larger than 
the difference between persons aged 24 and 25. Hence, a comparison between 19- and 20-year 
olds may reveal not only differences due to policy regimes but also due to “pure” age effects. 
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8 3.1  Identification of regime effects 
In general we have three age based policy regimes, all of which are defined by 
the age of the unemployed. The first regime covers teenagers (age 18-19), the 
second covers young adults (20-24), and the third covers adult unemployed 
(25+). In this paper we only study the two latter. 
Each regime may supply a number of characteristics, some which we may 
measure and some which we cannot measure. To summarize ideas, we may 
think of a regime as being defined by: 
 
•  The amount and quality of job search assistance provided before pro-
grammes  
•  The timing of programmes 
•  The selection of who goes into a program 
•  The length of programmes  
•  The content of programmes 
•  The economic compensation to programme participants 
 
Note that since all of these items may be known in advance by the unem-
ployed, it is possible that they affect the behaviour of the individual already be-
fore they take effect. Therefore we choose to study workers covered by the dif-
ferent regimes already from the start of their unemployment spells. 
Which of these regimes an unemployed is subject to is defined by his or her 
age. To further strengthen the identification, we include a linear function of age 
in days. This is to exclude the possibility that we are capturing age effects and 
attributing them as effects of policies. With such a control variable, we are only 
attributing systematic deviations from a linear relationship between date of 
births and outcomes as the effect of the reform. As we show, including further 
covariates does not matter substantially for our analysis.  
Apart from estimating OLS regressions, we also estimate Cox proportional 
hazard models, which assume that the log of the hazard out of unemployment is 
a linear function of the covariates, whereas the baseline hazard may vary freely 
with time under analysis. 
 
3.2  Identification of the relative effects of different  
programmes for participants 
We do not use the age discontinuities when studying the relative efficiency of 
different programs on the actual participants. Even though individuals over and 
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9 below an age threshold are offered different mixes of programmes (if they par-
ticipate at all), it may be misleading to make comparisons between the two 
groups if the selection processes into programmes are fundamentally different 
between the groups. Specifically, it is clear that the time to programs will have 
very different meaning for people covered by different regimes. A further indi-
cation that this is a real problem comes from the fact that our results suggest 
significant pre-treatment effects for young workers.  
Instead we use matching techniques and compare workers aged 20 to 24 
with similar (observed) labour market histories but who participate in different 
forms of programs. It is of course possible that the selection processes into the 
programmes differ between programmes, so that participants in some pro-
grammes are fundamentally different from participants in other programmes. 
To alleviate this identification problem, we adjust the comparisons with respect 
to a rich set of covariates. Our identifying assumption is that, conditional on 
covariates, there are no differences between participants in the municipality 
provided youth programmes and the programmes which also are available for 
the adult unemployed (and the same for participants in training programmes 
and practice programmes).  





4  Data and description 
We use data from various population-wide registers collected in the IFAU-
database. Our main data source which also defines our samples is the data base 
HÄNDEL which comprise various sets of information on all individuals regis-
tered at the PES including the timing of registration, program placements and 
reasons for leaving the registers. From this data base we get data on spells of 
registered unemployment, programs and various background characteristics. 
These data are available from 1990 to November 2005. 
To complement the PES data, we add information about employment, earn-
ings, schooling, welfare receipts and family situation from other registers 
which originally were collected by Statistics Sweden. These data are both used 
                                                      
11 The standard assumptions underlying this estimator are well known, and will not be discussed 
here. 
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10to construct control variables capturing family situation, immigration status, 
previous earnings, number of employers and welfare receipts and to construct 
similar outcome variables. Since the data coming from Statistics Sweden only 
are available up to 2003, the number of observations drops somewhat when 
studying these outcomes. 
When studying the differences in regimes we follow individuals from the 
date of registration and look at various outcomes relative to this date.
12 When 
studying the effects of programs, we construct the data similarly but measure 
outcomes relative to the date of program placement. Program effects are stud-
ied for all youths aged between 20 and 24 starting a program between 1999 and 
2003, whereas regime effects are identified from the differences between 24 
and 25 years old individuals registering between 1999 and 2003.  
Both the timing of programmes and the type of programme suggest that the 
discontinuity bites sharply on the age (in years) the individual will have 90 
days after registration as unemployed and thus we use this age when studying 
regimes. This is consistent both with intentions stated in various policy docu-
ments that young workers should not be unemployed without program place-
ment more than 100 days and with the regulations for the YG-programme stat-
ing that referral to programmes for workers below 25 should take place be-
tween the 90
th and the 120th day of an unemployment spell.  
In Figure 4.1 we show observable differences in how the unemployed are 
treated depending on age by showing differences between survival curves 
where the exit is programme start. We include all spells starting in 1999-2003 
for young persons in ages between 22 and 27 years. In all cases we censor 
spells that end before the start of a programme. The similarity in survival 
within cohorts in ages 25-27 and 22-24, respectively, and the difference be-
tween these two groups are striking. This evidence forcefully suggests that we 
are justified in treating young people in those ages as covered by two different 
policy regimes. The survival curves further suggest that those in ages 22-24 
years enter programmes significantly earlier than those between 25 and 27 
years. Still after 600 days there is a marked difference between the younger 
group and the older, but the most striking difference occurs in the neighbour-
hood of 100 days after the beginning of the unemployment spell. 
 
                                                      
12 Statistics Sweden’s data are annual and are measured relative to the calendar year of registra-
tion. 

















Note: Exits from registration are treated as censored. Estimates are corrected for month of registration.
 




5  Results – effects of policy regimes 
In this section we estimate the effects of the youth regime on various labour 
market related outcome variables. This will give an estimate of the overall ef-
fects of the youth regime. 
A first look at the programme effects can be provided by simply looking at 
the outflow to work from the unemployment registers, depending on age. 
Figure 5.1 shows differences in survival in the PES register where the exit is 
exit to work. The survival curves show that adults remain jobless to a much 
larger extent than the 22-24 year-olds. Furthermore, this difference occurs very 
early in the register spells – the main part of the difference arises within the 
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12first 100 days, i.e., before (expected) programme start.
13 The most natural in-
terpretation of this finding is that it reflects either an effect of intensified job 
search assistance early in the unemployment spells of young people or a pre-
programme deterrence effect.
14 This interpretation as well as the main thrust of 



















Note: Exits to other destinations than jobs are treated as censored. 
Estimates are corrected for month of registration.
 
Figure 5.1: Difference to 25 year olds in survival outside of job for different age 
groups. 
In addition to the “suggestive” evidence in Figure 5.1, we present a number of 
different regressions for effects on a number of possible outcomes. First, we 
use two measures derived from the PES registers: the probability of being in 
the PES registers at different dates, hazards to employment and to any destina-
                                                      
13 The institutional framework implies that programme starts should occur after around 100 days. 
See the description of the youth policy regime in Section 2. See also the description of pro-
gramme entrance in Figure 4.1. 
14 See Hägglund (2006) for a discussion of pre-programme effects as well as estimates of pre-
programme effects based on randomised experiments. 
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13 tion outside the PES registers.
15 These are outcomes considered in previous 
studies, which often have only had access to data from the National Labour 
Market Board. Second, we use information from registers collected by Statis-
tics Sweden to look at future earnings, employment and social assistance take-
up. These are outcomes that have rarely been considered in previous evalua-
tions of Swedish youth labour market programmes.  
Results are presented in Table 5.1. Note that the point of estimating the ef-
fects on various non-duration outcomes is that they study more long run effects 
that are measured outside of the initial unemployment spell. This is important 
to the extent that young persons are prone to have many and short spells of un-
employment. We also present Cox proportional hazard regressions which are 
stratified on month of inflow. All regressions are presented in two versions – 
one with and one without a large number of controls. Including covariates 
should increase efficiency but can also be viewed as a test of whether there are 
remaining selection issues despite the discontinuity set-up.  
The regression results first confirm the message of Figure 5.1: the young 
adults leave the register faster than the adults in the beginning but not later in 
the spells. This leads to a reduction by just above five days in the register dur-
ing the first year after the beginning of the unemployment spell. However, 
looking at outcomes dated one year or more after the beginning of spells, noth-
ing is significantly different from zero. The finding that there is no significant 
difference between the groups in the probability of being in the register after 
around one year suggests that young persons experience more of repeated un-
employment spells than the adults (compare to Figure 5.1 which displays dif-
ferences in survival). 
Once again, we think that the evidence either suggests effects of intensified 
job search assistance or pre-programme deterrence effects. Given the insignifi-
cant long-run effects, a natural conjecture is that programme participation in 
the YG programme is less effective than participation in the PES programmes. 
This is the subject matter of the next section. 
 
 
                                                      
15 The distinction between being registered at any point in time and the hazard out of the register 
is potentially important for young people, who may very well experience multiple short spells of 
employment and non-employment. 
IFAU – Swedish youth labour market policies revisited 
 
14Table 5.1: Effects of being 24 rather than 25 years old 90 days after registra-
tion. 
   Registration (PES) 
(# days from first registration) 
      




-0.019** -0.035** -0.013**  -0.004 0.001  -5.003**  -0.013  No  
controls  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.836) (0.014) 
         
-0.023** -0.042** -0.020**  -0.006 -0.000  -6.822**  -0.009  With 
Controls  (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.734) (0.013) 
N  251738 251738 251738 251738 198712 251634 132140 







 (t+1)  (t+2)  (t+2)  <120d >120d <120d  >120d 
-0.002 -0.008  -0.002  1.115**  1.008  1.117**  0.966**  No  
controls  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
              
-0.000 -0.007  -0.003  1.135**  1.090**  1.139**  1.053**  With 
Controls  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
N  201939 156094  156094  334195  334195 
Note: regressions are OLS, linear probability models or Cox Proportional Hazard models. All re-
gressions controls for age in days at registration. Other covariates capture education, family 
situation, labour market history and demographic characteristics. The variables are the same as in 
the matching described in Appendix A except for time to program which is not relevant in this 
application. All variables are measured at the start of the registration spell. Income is log annual 
income. Employment is a dummy measured in November by Statistics Sweden. Social assistance 
is a dummy variable for positive benefits during the calendar year. * (**) Significant at the 5 % 
(1 %) level. 
 
 
6  Results – the relative effects of  
programmes for young people 
In this section we study the effectiveness of the youth programmes relative to 
other programmes. First, we compare the municipality youth programme to 
PES-provided alternatives. There are no previous direct studies of this issue al-
though the timing of the hazards presented in Carling & Larsson (2005) as well 
as the results presented above suggest that the effects of the youth regime is 
less pronounced after the point at which program placements typically occurs. 
Second, we compare training programmes to practice programmes. The results 
in Larsson (2003) from such a comparison indicated better effects of the prac-
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15 tice programme, especially in the short run. However, her results pertain to the 
early 1990s, and both programmes and the economic environment have 
changed substantially since then.  
Since selection into different forms of programmes may well be non-
random we use a large number of available covariates to adjust for any ob-
served differences between different programme participants. This is done us-
ing both regression and propensity score matching. We estimate the effects on 
essentially the same outcomes as in the previous section, only measured from 
the start of the programme in this case. 
Table A1 provides a description of participants in the municipality provided 
YG program and participants in the PES administrated labour market training 
(LMT)
16 and work practice (WP) programs which are by far the two most 
common alternatives. By estimating a probit regression including these covari-
ates as well as dummies for month of registration and county dummies we pre-
dict the individuals’ propensity to participate in YG and create a matched sam-
ple drawn from the PES program participants by matching on the “nearest 
neighbour”. The third column shows the difference between the actual and 
matched samples along with standard errors. 
Table 6.1 shows estimated programme effects based on OLS and Cox pro-
portional hazard regressions as well as results based on propensity score match-
ing where both regressions and matching use all the covariates described in Ta-
ble A1. 
The results suggest that the municipality provided youth guarantee pro-
grammes (YG) are outperformed by the combination of labour market training 
and work practice provided by the PES: the YG participants experience more 
PES registration, slower hazards to jobs and to all exits, lower future income 
and employment and higher take-up of social assistance. The estimates are re-
markably similar between the matching approach and the parametric Cox and 
OLS regressions. 
The discrepancy between “all exits” and job exits estimates in Table 6.1 re-
flects that exits to regular education are more common among YG participants. 
It should be noted, however, that these exits should not be driving the other re-
sults – it is unlikely that more frequent exits to education both increase subse-
quent unemployment and reduce subsequent employment. 
 
                                                      
16 Including also ”preparatory training”. 
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(# days from programme starts)  Hazards 
  183 365 730  1095 To  job All 
Regres-
sions 
         
YG  0.009** -0.003  0.015** 0.010**  0.872** 0.975** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.008) (0.007) 
N  89986 89986  88329 73430  89986 89986 
Matching            
YG  -0,001 -0,010*  0,009* 0.011**  0,894**  0,996 
  (0,005) (0,004)  (0,004) (0.004)  (0,012) (0,010) 
Constant  0,431** 0,243**  0,148** 0.121**     
  (0,005) (0,004)  (0,003) (0.003)    
N  81470 81470  79604 64076  81470 81470 
  Non-PES administered outcomes 
 






sions        
YG  -0.173** -0.070**  -0.071**  0.032** 
  (0.014) (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
N  44026 74996  53716  53716 
Matching         
YG  -0,142** -0,061**  -0,068**  0.031** 
  (0,021) (0,006)  (0,007)  (0.006) 
Constant  6,528** 0,510**  0,575**  0.217** 
  (0,018) (0,005)  (0,006)  (0.005) 
N  37332 65652  46314  46314 
Note: regressions are OLS, linear probability models or Cox Proportional Hazard models. Match-
ing is by nearest neighbour, representative for YG. Various covariates capturing education. fam-
ily situation, labour market history and demographic characteristics are included. See Apendix A 
for a description. The same variables are included in the regressions as in the matching model. 
Income is log annual labour income. Employment dummy is measured in November by Statistics 
Sweden. Social assistance is a dummy variable. Standard errors are corrected for individual clus-
ters. * (**) Significant at the 5 % (1 %) level. 
 
In Table 6.2 we show the results when we compare training programmes to 
practice programmes. Descriptions of the samples are found in columns four to 
six in table A1 in the appendix. In terms of PES registration and hazards to jobs 
and all exits training does worse than practice. The effect on registration is, 
however, only significant over a one-year horizon. 
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Table 6.2: Estimates of relative programme effects – Training vs. Practice.  
  Registration  
(# days from programme starts)  Hazards 
  183 365 730  1095 To  job All 
Regres-
sions 
         
Training  0.072** 0.041**  -0.002  -0.000  0.855** 0.843** 
  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.010) (0.008) 
N  49229 49229  48529 41533  49229 49229 
Matching            
Training  0.059** 0.045**  0.004  0.003  0.881** 0.877** 
  (0.007) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.016) (0.013) 
Constant  0.402** 0.214**  0.142** 0.120**     
  (0.006) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.005)    
N  57286 57286  56545 47549  57286 57286 
  Non-PES administered outcomes 
 






sions        
Training  0.073** -0.003  0.014*  0.010* 
  (0.016) (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
N  25770 42285  30669  30669 
Matching         
Training  0.057* -0.009  0.020*  0.012 
  (0.024) (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Constant  6.646** 0.564**  0.603**  0.167** 
  (0.021) (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
N  29002 48624  34550  34550 
Note: regressions are OLS, linear probability models or Cox Proportional Hazard models. Match-
ing is by nearest neighbour, representative for the labour market training. Various covariates cap-
turing education. family situation, labour market history and demographic characteristics are in-
cluded. See Apendix A for a description. The same variables are included in the regressions as in 
the matching model. Income is log annual labour income. Employment dummy is measured in 
November by Statistics Sweden. Social assistance is a dummy variable. Standard errors are cor-
rected for individual clusters. * (**) Significant at the 5 % (1 %) level. 
 
When instead considering income, employment and social assistance take-
up, a somewhat different picture emerges. Training now outperforms practice 
in terms of the effects on both employment and income; these effects are sig-
nificantly positive the second year after programme entry. The matching esti-
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combination with the results on PES registration and hazards would be consis-
tent with training giving rise to human capital accumulation (both directly and 
indirectly through exits to regular education) giving positive treatment effects 
through higher productivity. This process seems to take some time, which, e.g., 
could be explained by the treatment (and the higher productivity associated 




The paper studies the efficiency of Swedish youth labour market policies. Us-
ing sharp age discontinuities which define which policy regime an individual is 
covered by we are able to present quasi-experimental evidence on the relative 
efficiency of different policy regimes currently in use. Our results show that 
youth policies are effective in shortening the unemployment spells of young 
workers. The effects mainly appear early in the unemployment spell and are 
short lived; we find no evidence of positive long run effects. Further results 
suggest that youth programmes run by the municipalities are outperformed by 
general labour market programmes when studying the effects on the actual par-
ticipants. A tentative conclusion is that the positive effects from youth policies 
are driven by higher quality search-assistance and/or pre-programme deterrence 
effects from early expected programme entry. Furthermore, the results suggest 
that decentralizing the implementation to the local authorities from the national 
Public Employment Service reduced program effectiveness in promoting tran-
sitions to jobs.  
Since we know little of what treatment the municipalities provide, we also 
study differences in effectiveness of different PES-administrated programs and 
find, in line with previous studies, that training programs have worse short run 
performance than practice programs. However, the long run results show signs 
of opposite effects. This result is interesting since it departs from the general 
notion that training programs are less effective than practice programs in Swe-
den. The results are consistent with training programs providing higher produc-
tivity and therefore higher reservation wages. However, given that this paper is 
the first to find this kind of long run effects, and that the results differ some-
what between outcome variables, the results call for further research on the 
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conclusions can be drawn.  
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22A Description  of  programme  partici-
pants 
Table A.1. Comparisons of actual and matched programme participants Mu-
nicipality vs PES and Labour Market Training vs. Work Practice. 
  Municipality vs. PES  LMT vs. WP 
  Munic. PES 
Matched 
difference  LMT  WP 
Matched 
difference 
2001.1 2000.9 0.021  2000.9 2000.8 -0.001  Year    (0.014)    (0.019) 
22.07 22.29 0.017 22.33 22.24 -0.006  Age    (0.015)    (0.021) 
0.587 0.632 0.006 0.662 0.590 -0.001  Male    (0.005)    (0.007) 
Immigration 
status 
      
0.171 0.131 -0.002 0.141 0.117 0.006  Non-Nordic im-
migrant    (0.004)    (0.005) 
0.006 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.007 -0.001  Nordic Immi-
grant.    (0.001)    (0.001) 
0.082 0.061 -0.004 0.068 0.051 -0.002  Swedish w. Non-
Nordic parent    (0.003)    (0.004) 
0.082 0.076 -0.003 0.079 0.072 -0.002  Swedish with 




      
0.011 0.012 0.001 0.010 0.014 -0.002  University  
(at lest 3 years)    (0.001)    (0.001) 
0.045 0.046 0.003 0.041 0.053 -0.003  Some post HS ed.     (0.002)    (0.003) 
0.138 0.146 0.005 0.146 0.147 -0.005  Academic High 
school    (0.003)    (0.005) 
0.404 0.352 -0.008 0.370 0.326 0.005  Not completed HS    (0.005)    (0.007) 
0.013 0.015 -0.000 0.013 0.018 0.001  Missing    (0.001)    (0.001) 
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  Municipality vs. PES  LMT vs. WP 
  Munic. PES 
Matched 
difference  LMT  WP 
Matched 
difference 
        Family 
(ref. no children)         
0.388 0.356 0.005  0.358 0.353 0.008  Living w parents 
  (0.005)    (0.007) 
0.038 0.029 0.000  0.027 0.031 0.001  Single parent 
  (0.002)    (0.002) 
0.081 0.091 -0.003 0.089 0.094 0.003  Couple with chil-
dren    (0.003)    (0.004) 
0.342 0.290 -0.014**  0.298 0.278 0.008  Social assistance 
previous year    (0.005)    (0.007) 
0.346 0.305 -0.012*  0.315 0.291 0.010  Social assistance 
two years before    (0.005)    (0.007) 
Labour market 
history 
       
0.177 0.153 0.006  0.143 0.166 0.003  First period 
  (0.004)    (0.005) 
0.504 0.458 0.008  0.459 0.458 -0.007  First programme  
  (0.005)    (0.007) 
398.1 398.0 11.006**  390.5 408.3 1.691  Days since last 
period    (4.090)    (5.492) 
315.7 350.9 -3.955 351.8 349.5 2.904  Number of days 
in prev. Periods    (3.415)    (5.046) 
429.8 550.3 14.094*  591.0 493.1 -13.540  Income previous 
year    (5.548)    (10.412) 
288.5 380.1 12.374**  400.7 351.3 -10.116  Income two years 
before    (4.418)    (8.716) 
1.059 1.193 0.018* 1.222 1.153 -0.006  # Employers pre-
vious year    (0.009)    (0.013) 
0.911 1.044 0.005  1.063 1.017 -0.012  # Employers two 
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  Municipality vs. PES  LMT vs. WP 
  Munic. PES 
Matched 
difference  LMT  WP 
Matched 
difference 
0.206 0.253 -0.001 0.247 0.262 -0.009  Search in extended 
geographic area     (0.004)    (0.006) 




       
0.378 0.293 -0.013*  0.292 0.294 0.007  Basic amount 
  (0.005)    (0.006) 
0.256 0.232 0.003  0.225 0.243 0.008   
None    (0.005)    (0.006) 
95.83 77.22 -0.381 78.24 75.78 1.074  Days in spell be-
fore program    (0.630)    (0.843) 
0.540 0.381 0.000  0.612 0.541 0.000  Propensity 
  (0.002)    (0.002) 
Periodes 
 
40735 49229 81470  28643 20578 57286 
Individuals  37056 44991 54791  26982 19520 36923 
Note: Data for programme spells starting between 1999 and 2003. Individuals are aged between 
20 and 24 at the time of programme entry. Only Labour Market Training and Work Practice 
spells are included in PES programs. Averages are for the full population. Differences are after 
nearest neighbour matching on probit-estimated propensity score. The probit included all listed 
covariates as well as 60 dummies for month of programme start and 24 county dummies. “Age” 
was interacted with “Year”. “Previous earnings” were included with squares. “Previous employ-
ers” were included as dummies (0,1, 2, at least 3). “Days in spell before program” were included 
as dummies (one for each 30 day period, one for 300-400 days). Standard errors are corrected for 
individual clusters. * (**) significant at 5 (1) percent level. 
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